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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the
Baltic States, and the former Soviet Union have introduced a series of fundamental
economic reforms, allowing market forces to play a significant role. Although monetary
and exchange rate policies varied significantly across countries (Desai, 1998, Kutan and
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due to monetary overhang. More recently, these countries have begun to experience
positive real economic growth. As countries display similar economic performance over
time, more real and monetary convergence in macroeconomic fundamentals is expected
because the impact of initial conditions declines over time (Backé et al., 2003). Three
reasons motivate our investigation of degree of convergence in transition economies.
First, the absence of economic convergence within a region may lead to social and
political instability due to economic performance that varies significantly across countries.
Second, the majority of the Central and Eastern European countries are the front-runners
for the European Union (EU) membership. Finally, the majority of the countries have
signed association agreements with the EU. Evidence of non-convergence would imply
that such institutional linkages with the EU do not necessarily promote macroeconomic
convergence.
Until recently, the literature has focused on the convergence of transition economies
to EU standards, while convergence within groups has been neglected. Brada and Kutan
(2001) examine monetary policy convergence between the candidate economies and the
EU, proxied by Germany, and find no convergence between base money in Germany and
the transition-economy candidates for EU membership. In contrast, the market-economy
candidates, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, show significant convergence with the German
money base. Korhonen and Fidrmuc (2001) test whether the candidate countries display
significant correlation of their supply and demand shocks with selected EU economies
from 1991 to 2000 and find that, except Estonia and Hungary, the candidate economies
display low correlation. Richards and Tersman (1996) examine the issue of price-level
convergence between the EU and the transition-economy candidates and find large gaps
in price levels with the latter countries exhibiting much lower levels than existing EU
members. Finally, Estrin et al. (2001) test whether convergence has occurred between the
ex-Communist block and the West, using per capita output data from 1970 to 1998, which
includes pre- and post-reform periods. These authors find little evidence of convergence
to the West, either during the pre-reform period or in the full period. Finally, Backé et al.
(2003) find significant differences in comparative price levels between EU countries and
most Central and Eastern European EU accession countries.
Kocˇenda (2001) is a notable exception because he studies the nominal and real
convergence of macroeconomic fundamentals in several groups of transition economies.
Based on geographical location and key institutional factors, such as the association
agreements with the EU, he examines real convergence based on industrial output
and monetary convergence using data on producer price index (PPI), consumer price
index (CPI), narrow money (M1), and nominal and real interest rates during the period
from January 1991 to December 1998. Utilizing a commonly employed panel unit root
technique, the author tests for convergence within transition countries grouped according
to different institutional and geographical aspects. His results indicate considerable real
and monetary convergence; real output displays the greatest degree of convergence across
all groups of countries while price levels exhibit the least. The first-round EU candidates
show relatively high degrees of convergence. However, as a specific group sharing tight
exchange rate regimes and no independent monetary policy, the Baltic States yield the
highest degree of convergence.
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real and nominal economic convergence of transition economies by extending Kocˇenda’s
study in a more stable post-1993 period to examine the robustness of his findings when
the turbulent years of transition are omitted.1 Second, we investigate the sensitivity of
his convergence results by using a less restrictive panel estimation technique. Kocˇenda’s
methodology assumes that countries share a common convergence rate toward long run
equilibrium. In this paper, we allow for heterogeneity in these rates to investigate the
impact of imposing fewer restrictions on convergence results. Allowing for such disparities
in the transition countries’ paths to their steady states yields significantly different results
and new policy implications. In the next section, we describe our panel methodology and
compare it with Kocˇenda’s technique. Section 3 explains our data discuss the convergence
results. Section 4 concludes with the policy implications of our findings.
2. Methodology
In the past decade, much empirical work on neoclassical growth model uses time series
methodology to test for a convergence hypothesis. Based mainly on unit root tests, this
literature focuses on capturing the persistence of shocks relative to per capita incomes.2
Stochastic convergence applies if per capita income disparities between economies follow
a mean–stationary process so that relative per capita income shocks lead to transitory
deviations from any tendency toward convergence. Such stationarity would imply that the
economies have reached their own steady state. Univariate unit root tests suffer from low
statistical power in finite samples, which may lead to failures in rejecting a false null-
hypothesis. To address this issue, panel unit root tests that have significantly increased
power are used to test for convergence in Quah (1992), Levin and Lin (1993), and Im et al.
(2003).
Quah (1992) considers the simple following dynamic model to improve the power of
the univariate Dickey–Fuller procedures:
(1)(yi,t − y¯t )= ρ(yi,t−1 − y¯t−1)+ εi,t ,
where yi,t − y¯t is the income disparity from mean output, or from the benchmark economy
of i = 1, . . . ,N countries at time t . He suggests a pooled ordinary-least-squares (OLS)
estimation, in which values of ρ less than 1 indicate that disparity from the mean is
decreasing with time. Quah shows that his statistic converges weakly to N(0,1) as the
number of countries and sample size get large; he uses this technique to find evidence
against convergence to US output.
1 Bernard and Durlauf (1996) criticize time series tests of convergence as being unreliable when used for
countries that are far away from their steady state.
2 Earlier papers concentrate on the notions of β convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), in which poor
countries grow faster than rich ones, and σ convergence (Friedman, 1992; Quah, 1993), in which income variance
between poor and rich countries is diminishing. Our analysis concentrates on stochastic convergence, which does
not require each country to converge to the same steady state.
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denoted LL, by considering the following three models:
(2)∆(yi,t − y¯t )= ρ(yi,t−1 − y¯t−1)+ αmidmt + εi,t
for m = 1,2,3 and where dmt contains deterministic variables, namely, d1t = {·},
d2t = {1}, d3t = {1, t}. In other words, they improve on Quah’s method by including
fixed effects and individual time trends for each country. Such a framework allows both
different steady states for the variable yi,t and different time trends for each country. After
establishing that asymptotics of their statistics converge weakly to N(0,1)under the null-
hypothesis, these authors illustrate that the no convergence hypothesis, namely ρ = 0, can
be tested against the alternative hypothesis of income disparities dampening over time,
ρ < 0. Kocˇenda (2001) utilizes this methodology to demonstrate convergence in transition
economies.3
Both the Quah and the LL tests, and consequently Kocˇenda’s methodology, assume
that ρ, and hence the convergence rate (1 − ρ), is the same for all countries in each
group. This homogeneity assumption requires all countries within each group to share a
common average speed of adjustment to steady state equilibria in all variables. Hence,
only inference about convergence rate of the whole group can be drawn. Therefore, this
approach provides a natural and appealing technique for comparing the behavior of the
cross-section of countries over time. However, a different technique should be used for
individual countries to allow for differences in their convergence rates. As we demonstrate,
this technique generates distinctly different results when applied to the same economic data
if heterogeneity within the group members is statistically significant.
Im et al. (2003) relax the assumption of homogeneity in convergence rates because
of potential bias in heterogeneous panels. Therefore, their test does not impose identical
convergence rates and consequently avoids possible misspecification of the model, which
may lead to false inference. Their method, denoted IPS, pools N separate independent
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) regressions:
(3)∆(yi,t − y¯t )= δi + ρi(yi,t−1 − y¯t−1)+
p∑
k=1
φi,k∆(yi,t−k − y¯t−k)+ ui,t .
This procedure allows for heterogeneity in ρ by testing the null-hypothesis, ρi = 0 for
all I , against the alternative hypothesis, ρi < 0 for at least one i . The limiting distribution
for their t-statistic is given as
(4)
√
N
(t¯ADF −µADF)√
σ 2ADF
→N(0,1),
where the moments µADF and σ 2ADF are obtained from Monte Carlo simulations, and t¯ADF
is the average estimated ADF t-statistics from the sample. They perform subsequent Monte
Carlo simulations to compare the size and power performance of their method with that of
3 Kocˇenda extends this methodology by controlling for serial correlation in errors and computing the exact
sample critical values for the tests.
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especially when the number of countries is small, but it also has better size properties when
the choice of the ADF order is misspecified.
LL and IPS techniques both share the common assumption of an identically and
independently distributed (i.i.d.) error structure. When this assumption is violated and
residuals are contemporaneously correlated, Maddala and Wu (1999) and Strauss and
Yigit (2003) show that both techniques will suffer from significant size distortions that
do not disappear by simple demeaning. Therefore, for the remaining part of the paper,
we make size adjustments by deriving new critical values for both the LL and IPS tests.
The simulated values are generated from 3000 iterations using the contemporaneous
correlation matrices obtained from the datasets used in the estimations. Critical values
corresponding to those estimations that require a trend were generated using a trend.
Differences in performance of these two techniques are caused mainly by the imposition
of the homogeneity assumption in LL. Despite the appeal of analyzing the behavior of
entire group overtime, the assumption of a common convergence rate may lead to false
inference due to the misspecification of the model. These disparities will grow as the
degree of heterogeneity within the panels gets larger indicating different paths to steady
states. This possibility of misspecification in an LL test motivates our re-examination of
Kocˇenda’s results by using a new test for convergence among transition economies.
3. Convergence of transition economies
Following Kocˇenda (2001), we test for convergence in seasonally adjusted growth rates
in monthly output (industrial production), price (PPI and CPI), narrow money (M1), and
nominal and real interest rate spreads series for 5 groups of countries.4 The first group
is original participants of Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), namely, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The second group is these five
CEFTA countries plus Romania. The third group consists of leading accession countries to
the EU, namely, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The fourth
group is made of laggard EU accession countries, namely, Latvia, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Lithuania, and Bulgaria.5 The final group is the Baltic countries, namely Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. The data are obtained from International Financial Statistics of the
IMF.
We concentrate on a more recent and less turbulent period than did Kocˇenda, namely
the beginning of 1993 to the end of 2000. The reason for this change in coverage is
that evidence for stochastic convergence, when present, should be stronger with closer
proximity to the steady state. The descriptive statistics in Table 1, especially the standard
4 Spread is measured as the difference between lending and deposit rates. Real spread is constructed by
subtracting inflation from the nominal spread.
5 Kocˇenda divides the transition countries into first- and second-group EU candidate countries. Our
classification of front-runners and laggards correspond to that of Kocˇenda, respectively, in terms of country
coverage. Although Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia are now officially included in the first-round candidate
countries, we include them here in the laggards’ group for comparison purposes with Kocˇenda.
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Means and standard deviations of percentage growth rates, with standard deviations in parentheses and Kocˇenda
values in bold
Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
Czech 4.96 4.08 7.29 11.93 1.83 1.00
(8.6) (2.1) (3.0) (18.29) (0.1) (0.7)
1.97 4.54 8.42 11.35 1.81 −3.04
(9.77) (1.95) (2.33) (20.68) (0.14) (2.04)
Slovakia 3.61 8.80 6.12 6.40 1.55 0.74
(4.9) (3.2) (3.4) (9.4) (0.2) (0.3)
−1.67 5.96 9.90 8.52 1.56 −4.15
(5.02) (3.41) (5.38) (7.54) (0.22) (5.27)
Poland 5.06 13.31 16.25 23.49 1.23 0.39
(9.2) (7.8) (7.7) (10.3) (0.2) (0.3)
−12.34 18.94 22.53 25.64 1.16 −19.38
(8.82) (8.03) (9.94) (7.60) (0.17) (12.35)
Hungary 9.59 14.40 16.05 14.38 1.29 0.33
(7.3) (6.7) (5.6) (6.1) (0.1) (0.1)
−4.69 9.54 18.56 13.99 1.31 −13.39
(21.51) (17.82) (4.47) (8.08) (0.17) (3.61)
Slovenia 2.96 8.02 10.42 26.21 1.54 0.82
(4.2) (4.6) (3.7) (15.6) (0.1) (0.2)
−9.34 11.80 13.99 29.65 1.51 −5.16
(9.99) (9.12) (10.20) (16.83) (0.18) (6.53)
Estonia 4.25 11.86 11.86 28.57 2.25 1.04
(15.7) (10.8) (10.8) (23.4) (0.4) (0.8)
−5.58 12.35 28.01 30.94 2.22 −16.32
(15.44) (7.70) (28.21) (28.24) (0.46) (19.02)
Latvia 7.21 12.45 4.50 16.21 2.44 2.22
(20.0) (10.4) (6.1) (13.8) (0.5) (1.2)
−7.00 39.53 26.00 18.44 2.43 −0.70
(16.47) (102.27) (34.22) (14.66) (0.54) (10.42)
Lithuania −2.06 31.11 34.68 23.09 1.69 4.71
(22.4) (47.3) (59.9) (23.5) (0.5) (13.6)
−18.42 42.78 38.49 29.93 1.63 −31.74
(35.83) (66.98) (50.12) (21.90) (0.49) (52.16)
Romania −0.90 54.16 52.94 43.32 NA NA
(11.6) (33.8) (32.9) (13.8) NA NA
−79.60 70.98 73.50 48.90 NA NA
(45.70) (37.37) (39.76) (19.50) NA NA
Bulgaria 3.09 67.20 71.02 63.52 2.51 −1.04
(12.2) (84.3) (105.8) (68.2) (1.2) (17.8)
NA NA 73.74 78.05 2.10 −56.93
NA NA (77.31) (71.84) (1.19) (70.87)
Note: NA means data not available.
deviations, illustrate this point as they are consistently below the values in Kocˇenda’s
tables. In our paper, we measure real convergence using real industrial production variable,
while our analysis of nominal convergence starts with the tests of monetary policy
convergence. Although we use both narrow money and interest rate spreads to measure
monetary convergence, we think that interest rate spreads are better measures of monetary
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directly and thus affect the composition of M1. Hence, changes in M1 are more a policy
reflection of outcomes than of the actual implementation of policy. Therefore, we rely more
on interest rate results in our conclusions. Additional tests for nominal convergence using
the CPI and the PPI reflect not only monetary policy outcomes, but also the trade linkages
between the countries.
Initially, we conduct LL tests on the same sets of countries and variables in Kocˇenda
to examine the sensitivity of his results to using an updated dataset. For these tests and
subsequent IPS panel unit root tests, the data are demeaned to remove the common time
component, which might cause false inference due to cross–correlation within the panels.
New critical values are derived for both LL and IPS tests to correct for the size distortions
Table 2
Critical values for the replication of Kocˇenda type estimations
Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
CEFTA-5 1% −2.75 −3.09 −3.16 −2.81 −2.91 −2.82
5% −2.02 −2.33 −2.48 −2.14 −2.16 −2.04
10% −1.62 −1.93 −2.04 −1.75 −1.80 −1.66
CEFTA-6 1% −2.87 −3.07 −3.27 −3.07
5% −2.13 −2.36 −2.50 −2.19
10% −1.73 −1.92 −2.08 −1.83
Front-runners 1% −2.91 −3.49 −3.42 −2.82 −2.77 −2.87
5% −2.14 −2.66 −2.68 −2.11 −2.18 −2.13
10% −1.76 −2.21 −2.27 −1.72 −1.78 −1.77
Laggards 1% −2.89 −3.28 −3.02 −3.00
5% −2.20 −2.43 −2.27 −2.24
10% −1.80 −2.03 −1.83 −1.87
Baltics 1% −2.76 −2.97 −3.68 −2.76 −2.63 −2.80
5% −2.11 −2.29 −2.88 −2.00 −1.95 −2.12
10% −1.72 −1.94 −2.42 −1.67 −1.59 −1.76
Table 3
Moments of the IPS t-bar statistic (mean value), simulated under the consideration of cross-correlations within
groups
Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
CEFTA-5 −2.17 −2.16 −2.16 −2.17 −2.16 −2.16
(0.56) (0.49) (0.45) (0.54) (0.55) (0.50)
CEFTA-6 −1.52 −2.17 −1.51 −2.17
(0.68) (0.53) (0.61) (0.52)
Front-runners −1.51 −2.15 −2.16 −2.17 −2.16 −2.16
(0.63) (0.40) (0.35) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53)
Laggards −2.03 −1.44 −2.16 −1.51
(0.67) (0.60) (0.52) (0.62)
Baltics −1.51 −1.50 −2.15 −1.51 −2.16 −2.03
(0.63) (0.45) (0.11) (0.64) (0.58) (0.69)
Note. Variance in parentheses.
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LL convergence coefficients for all groups, with t-statistics in parentheses
Group Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
CEFTA-5 0.83*** 0.97*** 0.98** 0.96*** 0.97** 0.95***
(−4.23) (−3.99) (−2.91) (−3.69) (−2.50) (−2.93)
CEFTA-6 0.85*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.96***
(−4.42) (−7.20) (−5.01) (−3.89)
Front-runners 0.83*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.97* 0.95***
(−3.71) (−3.91) (−4.43) (−4.05) (−1.79) (−3.48)
Laggards 0.80*** 0.90*** 0.97*** 0.97***
(−4.05) (−7.14) (−3.97) (−3.44)
Baltics 0.78*** 0.93*** 0.83*** 0.93*** 0.82*** 0.70***
(−4.54) (−4.18) (−11.15) (−3.26) (−4.15) (−3.05)
Notes. 1. CEFTA-5 refers to the original CEFTA countries. 2. CEFTA-6 includes Romania. 3. Interest rate results
for the CEFTA-6 and the laggard candidate countries are not reported due to lack of data on Romanian interest
rates. 4. Since the samples are different, we derive our own critical values in Table 2 to determine the significance
levels.
* Significant at the 90% level.
** Idem., 95%.
*** Idem., 99%.
caused by residual cross correlation; we record these in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 4, we
present the coefficient values and significance levels for the LL tests using the different
time periods from that of Kocˇenda. For this table and the remaining ones, the reported
coefficients are one plus the estimates of the autoregressive term ρ or ρi from Eqs. (2)
and (3), and the t-statistics below them are for the one-tailed test of ρ equaling to 0. The
results in Table 4 indicate both real and nominal convergence between the countries in each
group as found by Kocˇenda. Hence, moving the window of analysis from 1991 to 1998 to
1993 to 2000 does not lead to significant differences in evidence supporting convergence.
The key issue is the sensitivity of the results to using a different panel approach that
imposes a less restrictive assumption about convergence rates.
Application of IPS tests on the same sets of variables shows that the strong evidence
for convergence found in almost all series in Kocˇenda is not robust to allowing for
heterogeneity in convergence rates. Furthermore, average convergence rates of groups from
LL estimations are lower than the convergence rates found using the IPS technique.6 When
comparing the results in these tables with those of Kocˇenda’s in Table 4, one should keep
in mind that the IPS methodology tests for convergence within a group by averaging the
t-statistics of the individual countries in the group while LL tests used by Kocˇenda employ
the t-statistic for the entire group. We report the individual country statistics as well to
indicate potential non-convergent countries.
For the original CEFTA countries, Table 5 indicates real convergence as found also
by Kocˇenda, who suggests that this result is likely to be driven by the institutional trade
6 Using a different methodology, Lee et al. (1997) show that not allowing for heterogeneity in convergence
rates biases them downward.
A.M. Kutan, T.M. Yigit / Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (2004) 23–36 31Table 5
IPS convergence coefficients for original CEFTA countries, with individual t-statistics in parentheses
Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
Czech 0.50 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.79 0.95
(−3.49) (−1.77) (−1.38) (−2.36) (−2.22) (−0.73)
Hungary 0.32 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.68
(−3.72) (−2.52) (−2.76) (−1.2) (−2.49) (−2.91)
Poland 0.83 0.89 0.94 0.93 0.83 0.87
(−1.96) (−2.53) (−1.07) (−1.17) (−2.04) (−2.20)
Slovakia 0.79 0.84 0.90 0.94 0.66 0.71
(−1.55) (−1.91) (−2.19) (−1.33) (−2.57) (−3.31)
Slovenia 0.63 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.31 0.75
(−2.91) (−2.14) (−2.73) (−2.42) (−4.14) (−3.18)
t-bar −2.73** −2.17 −2.03 −1.62 −2.69* −2.47
Standardized t-bar −1.66** −0.001 0.44 1.69 −1.57* −0.93
Notes. 1. All series include 96 observations and a time trend. 2. The averages of t-statistics are compared to
simulated values of mean and variance in Table 3. 3. Significance values for individual ρi are not reported
because the IPS (2003) methodology only derives the probability distribution and computes the critical values
of their average, t-bar.
* Significant at the 90% level.
** Idem., 95%.
Table 6
IPS convergence coefficients for enlarged CEFTA countries, with individual t-statistics in parenthesis
Industrial PPI CPI M1
production
Czech 0.64 0.89 0.91 0.79
(−3.02) (−3.38) (−2.71) (−3.91)
Hungary 0.62 0.88 0.95 0.97
(−2.64) (−5.14) (−2.67) (−0.82)
Poland 0.72 0.90 0.96 0.92
(−2.62) (−2.62) (−1.74) (−1.43)
Romania 0.82 0.86 0.94 0.82
(−2.14) (−4.14) (−2.42) (−2.49)
Slovakia 0.84 0.81 0.96 0.92
(−1.14) (−3.62) (−1.67) (−1.38)
Slovenia 0.74 0.86 0.938 0.87
(−2.49) (−3.28) (−2.01) (−2.45)
t-bar −2.34*** −3.69*** −2.20** −2.08
Standardized t-bar −2.40*** −5.06*** −2.13** 0.34
Notes. 1. Only PPI and M1 growth series have a time trend. 2. Interest rate spread results are not reported due to
lack of data on Romanian interest rates. 3. Significance values for individual ρi are not reported because the IPS
(2003) methodology only derives the probability distribution and computes the critical values of their average,
t-bar.
** Significant at the 95% level.
*** Idem., 99%.
linkages between countries in CEFTA. However, no evidence of nominal convergence is
found. Hence, we conclude that the countries have experienced uncommon money and
price shocks that were driven by different types of supply and demand shocks. Dibooglu
and Kutan (2001) report similar results for real exchange rates in transition economies.
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IPS convergence coefficients for the leading EU candidate countries, with individual t-statistics in parentheses
Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
Czech 0.77 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.60 0.92
(−1.72) (−1.63) (−1.05) (−2.03) (−4.76) (−1.17)
Estonia 0.85 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.51 0.63
(−1.60) (−1.63) (−2.85) (−2.28) (−6.01) (−3.24)
Hungary 0.73 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.75 0.75
(−2.02) (−2.46) (−2.88) (−1.68) (−3.71) (−2.75)
Poland 0.73 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.71 0.63
(−2.50) (−2.24) (−2.40) (−2.11) (−4.12) (−3.32)
Slovenia 0.67 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.55 0.53
(−2.66) (−2.92) (−2.55) (−2.44) (−5.68) (−3.96)
t-bar −2.10** −2.17 −2.34 −2.10 −4.86*** −2.88**
Standardized t-bar −1.64** −0.05 −0.67 0.23 −8.33*** −2.18**
Notes. 1. All growth series, except industrial production, have a time trend. 2. Significance values for individual
ρi are not reported because the IPS (2003) methodology only derives the probability distribution and computes
the critical values of their average, t-bar.
** Significant at the 95% level.
*** Idem., 99%.
Romania is added to the original five CEFTA countries in Table 6. We observe continued
real convergence and the emergence of price-level convergence for both CPI and PPI, but
we continue to find no evidence of monetary policy (M1) convergence. This dramatic
change in results when one country is added raises concern about panel unit root tests
in testing for convergence in the presence of outliers.
Table 7 reports the results for the leading EU accession candidate countries, denoted
as front-runners. These consist of the CEFTA-5 without Slovakia but Estonia added. We
find moderate evidence for real convergence and significant monetary policy convergence,
using interest rate spreads. Price level convergence and convergence in money supply
growth are not found; this may be due to different inflationary or supply shocks across
countries.
Table 8 reports the findings for the laggard EU accession candidate countries. Unlike
for the front-runners, no evidence of real convergence is found. However, there is a
significant degree of price-level convergence for both CPI and PPI and money supply (M1)
convergence, which is consistent with the results in Kocˇenda.7 These results suggest that
the laggards have made significant progress in price convergence due to implementation
of significant disinflation policies after 1993. This leads us to believe that the gap between
the leading and laggard candidate countries is not as large as expected.8 A recent decision
by the European Council (EC) on the enlargement issue supports our findings. In the EC
7 Kocˇenda does not report results for real convergence for the laggard candidates due to lack of data.
8 However, the result does not mean that the leading group candidate countries have made no progress. Rather,
it suggests that the laggards have made harmonious progress toward their long run equilibrium relative to the
leading countries after 1993.
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IPS convergence coefficients for the laggard candidate countries, with individual t-statistics in parentheses
Industrial production PPI CPI M1
Bulgaria 0.25 0.93 0.93 0.94
(−2.14) (−3.35) (−2.11) (−2.61)
Latvia 0.83 0.94 0.94 0.92
(−1.04) (−3.71) (−2.21) (−1.73)
Lithuania 0.84 0.94 0.95 0.91
(−0.67) (−2.90) (−1.66) (−2.20)
Romania 0.44 0.45 0.71 0.92
(−1.73) (−5.18) (−9.61) (−1.95)
Slovakia 0.28 0.94 0.94 0.93
(−2.49) (−3.48) (−2.14) (−2.58)
t-bar −1.61 −3.72*** −3.54*** −2.21**
Standardized t-bar 1.14 −6.52*** −4.24*** −1.96**
Notes. 1. Only industrial production and CPI growth series have a time trend. 2. Significance values for individual
ρi are not reported because the IPS (2003) methodology only derives the probability distribution and computes
the critical values of their average, t-bar.
** Significant at the 95% level.
*** Idem., 99%.
Table 9
IPS results for Baltic States (coefficients and individual t-statistics)
Industrial PPI CPI M1 Nominal Real
production spread spread
Estonia 0.85 0.90 0.765 0.94 0.56 0.46
(−2.13) (−2.29) (−5.22) (−2.16) (−2.64) (−5.32)
Latvia 0.64 0.91 0.70 0.90 0.43 0.48
(−3.69) (−2.45) (−8.03) (−2.03) (−3.56) (−5.02)
Lithuania 0.85 0.94 0.68 0.90 0.42 0.42
(−2.51) (−1.95) (−10.18) (−1.81) (−3.69) (−5.32)
t-bar −2.78*** −2.23** −7.81*** −2.00 −3.29*** −5.22***
Standardized t-bar −2.76*** −1.81** −29.29*** −1.02 −2.54*** −6.60***
Notes. 1. Only CPI growth and spread series have a time trend. 2. Significance values for individual ρi are not
reported because the IPS (2003) methodology only derives the probability distribution and computes the critical
values of their average, t-bar.
** Significant at the 95% level.
*** Idem., 99%.
meeting in Copenhagen in December 2002, it was decided that, along with the front-
runners, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania would also join the EU on May 1, 2004. In relation
to other laggard countries, i.e., Bulgaria and Romania, the EU expects that these countries
will become members in 2007. Finally, Table 9 indicates that the Baltic countries converge
in almost all macroeconomic series, except money supply growth. The lack of convergence
in M1 is likely due to the currency board regimes adopted by these countries during our
sample period.
In summary, our results suggest that significant monetary policy convergence, as
measured by interest rate spreads, has been achieved in the transition economies. We also
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Comparison of results: is there stochastic convergence?
Group Industrial production PPI CPI
Kocˇenda Ours Kocˇenda Ours Kocˇenda Ours
CEFTA-5 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
CEFTA-6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Front runners Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Laggards N/A No N/A Yes Yes Yes
Baltics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
M1 Nominal spread Real spread
Kocˇenda Ours Kocˇenda Ours Kocˇenda Ours
CEFTA-5 Yes Yes Yes Weak Yes No
CEFTA-6 Yes No
Front runners Yes No Weak Yes Yes Yes
Laggards Yes Yes
Baltics Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. 1. N/A indicates that no results are included in Kocˇenda due to lack of data. 2. ‘Weak’ indicates evidence
of convergence at the 90% significance level.
find evidence of real convergence in the original CEFTA group, the leading EU accession
candidates, and the Baltic countries. Price level convergence is more evident in the Baltic
countries and the laggard EU candidate countries. This latter finding is due primarily to
our post-1993 sample period because the leading EU candidates and the original five
CEFTA countries achieved significant price-level convergence in the early 1990s. The least
convergence is observed in money supply (M1) growth. Table 10 presents the differences
between our results and those of Kocˇenda. The entries in bold indicate different inferences
regarding convergence. The key difference is that our evidence indicates less convergence
in the price indexes and M1. Nominal spread results are also sensitive to the methodology
used. We find stronger convergence in nominal spreads for the Baltic countries and weaker
convergence for the CEFTA-5 members. Our results also show that panel tests are sensitive
to outliers in data.
4. Policy implications and conclusions
We test for real and monetary stochastic convergence in transition economies, using
macroeconomic data from January 1993 to December 2000. Using a different sample
period but employing the same method used by Kocˇenda, we find no qualitatively different
inferences about convergence. However, employing a less restricted panel test that does
not impose the assumption of homogeneity in convergence rates, we find less degree of
monetary convergence, measured by CPI, PPI, and M1 growth, and real interest spread.
Our results suggest that inferences about convergence among transition economies may
be more sensitive to restrictions placed on the panel technique employed than to the data
period used.
These findings have important policy implications. First, the lack of monetary and
price convergence for the leading EU accession candidate countries indicates that these
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lack of nominal convergence may delay their entry into the European Monetary Union
(EMU). Second, we find significant real convergence within all transition countries, with
the exception of the laggard EU accession countries. We use industrial production, which
may capture supply as well as demand shocks, to measure real convergence. Hence, our
findings indicate that the laggard EU candidate countries have experienced different supply
and demand shocks that display no convergence with shocks in other countries within the
group. As an important policy implication, the laggard candidate countries must retain
some degree of policy autonomy to deal with such shocks, the magnitude and timing of
which may differ significantly from the shocks affecting other countries in that group. With
regard to exchange rate policy, more flexible exchange rate policies are recommended for
these countries.
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